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Abstract: 
The concept of “global commons” has been applied under international law to certain 
special environments for which states have agreed to prohibit national appropriation and 
to treat these spaces as “the province of all mankind” (Outer Space Treaty 1967). After 
tracing the origins of the concept with reference to the law of the sea, the paper examines 
two relatively new environments, outer space and cyberspace, for which the status of 
“global commons” can facilitate the emergence of a cooperative security regime. The 
various diplomatic efforts to develop international security arrangements for these vital, if 
fragile, environments are reviewed and prospects for their successful adoption assessed. 
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Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms  
 
International security policy has most often been a function of competition between 
sovereign states over divergent national interests. This competition is rooted in the requirement 
of the state to defend its national assets – territory, people, resources, infrastructure etc. – from 
encroachment by other states or external forces. This requirement leads in turn to the creation of 
armed forces and the other components of national security establishments in order to protect 
these sovereign assets. But what is the appropriate security posture to assume with respect to 
spaces beyond the claims of sovereign states and national appropriation? These spaces are 
comprised of the so-called “global commons” that have been the subject of special regimes 
devised by sovereign states.1 These regimes recognized the importance of access to and use of 
the spaces concerned by states for a variety of security and economic ends, while sometimes 
granting them a distinctive status as a “common heritage of mankind”.  
Global Commons 
The earliest example of such a space and a special regime applied to it was the maritime 
domain. The initial navigational accomplishments of Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries (unlike their terrestrial conquests) could not be translated into enduring 
control over the world’s oceans. Other powers also wanted to exploit the new maritime routes 
and the only alternative to permanent conflict was to arrive at some generally acceptable 
governance of the seas. Building on the writings of the international legal pioneer Hugo Grotius, 
states gradually embraced his concept of an international maritime order which consisted of two 
parts: a territorial sea under exclusive sovereign control (which custom eventually set at three 
miles because that was the range of land-based cannons at the time) and the ‘high seas’ that were 
opened for common use and owned by none.2 This construct has been largely upheld by states 
over several centuries and has received its most comprehensive codification in the UN Law of 
the Sea Convention of 1982. There are two other environments however to which access has 
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only been possible much more recently and for which common understandings and international 
agreements are just beginning to emerge. These environments are becoming increasingly 
important for a range of security, commercial and scientific pursuits although their character 
under international law and the practice of states is only now being shaped. What international 
security order, if any, will be established for these two environments remains to be seen, but the 
expansion of access and usage of both should act as a spur to states to agree on a common 
approach sooner rather than later.  
The two environments in question are outer space and cyberspace (or as some prefer 
“information space”). In considering these realms from an international security perspective, one 
is struck by several key similarities, but also some significant differences between them. In 
policy terms, this article will argue that there is room in both “spaces” for an exercise of 
preventive diplomacy and the development of measures of confidence building and cooperative 
security. We will first review the parallels between the environments and then proceed to an 
examination of the differences including how well the “global commons” designation applies to 
them. On the basis of this comparative analysis we can discuss the case for sustaining the 
present, essentially benign operating environment of the two spaces through a conscious policy 
of international security cooperation. This cooperation frequently develops through a continuum 
that begins with the expression of principles or norms for state conduct, proceeds through the 
elaboration of political arrangements or measures and culminates in binding international 
agreements. The chief diplomatic proposals that have been put forward to secure such 
cooperation in the space and cyber realms will be examined and the article will conclude with an 
assessment of the prospects for cooperation in these two special security realms.  
The Similarities 
The first similarity of outer space and cyberspace, beyond their relative vastness, is their 
“global commons” character. In both cases the international community has acknowledged that 
these environments in some way belong to humanity and are beyond national appropriation. In 
the case of outer space, this “global commons” status is explicitly set out in the foundational 
Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Article I of that treaty stipulates that the use of outer space “shall be 
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carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…and shall be the province of all 
mankind”. Article II reinforces this concept of global ownership by specifying that outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is “not subject to national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”.3 With respect to 
cyberspace, this “global commons” status is not as explicitly or legally set out as is the case with 
outer space, but a similar vision animates the pronouncements of states. The most authoritative 
of these statements to date were those agreed to by consensus at the UN-mandated World 
Summit on the Information Society, which was held in two stages in Geneva and Tunis in 2003 
and 2005 respectively. The Declaration of Principles adopted by WSIS described “a people-
centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, 
access, utilize and share information and knowledge…”.4 More recently, through the results of a 
series of UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” the notion of 
cyberspace as a special realm to be used for the good of humanity and in a peaceful manner has 
also been advanced. The latest GGE report, for example, underscores “the aspirations of the 
international community to the peaceful use of Information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) for the common good of mankind”.5 
Other analysts have suggested that the question of access is the defining characteristic of 
a commons. Within an international security perspective, national security actors have stressed 
the importance of maintaining free access to the global commons. Illustrative of this perspective 
and policy orientation are the pronouncements of the U.S. national security establishment. In a 
policy document outlining defense priorities for the 21st century the US Department of Defense 
declared: “America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek 
to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons – those areas beyond national 
jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system”.6 In a NATO 
document entitled Assured Access to the Global Commons the authors identify this commons as 
comprised of the four domains of maritime, air, space and cyber and assert that “the security and 
prosperity of our nations, individually and for the Alliance as a whole, rely on assured access to 
and use of the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains that are the commons”.7 Another 
military writer has described cyberspace, the newest of the domains, as “characterized by 
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permeable physical, political and social boundaries and a cyber culture that vigorously resists 
state control…the cyber domain is available to all nations and regarded as part of the global 
commons”.8 
The second similarity is that both outer space and cyberspace currently are being utilized 
to provide a wide array of services and benefits, overwhelmingly civilian in nature. 
Approximately 1200 satellites are currently operating in outer space on behalf of 60 states or 
commercial consortia.9 Space-based services are being utilized by consumers around the globe. 
The exploitation of cyberspace is even more extensive with over three billion Internet users and 
an increasing penetration in the developing world, where the majority of users now reside. 
The third common feature is that while military activity is present in both environments, 
and has been for several years, these environments have not yet been “weaponized” or 
transformed into active battle zones. In this context, “weaponization” means the general 
introduction into an environment of offensive arms capable of destroying or damaging objects 
within that same environment. Moreover, beyond exercising restraint regarding the introduction 
of weapons, there is an evident direction on the part of states to maintain a peaceful character for 
these environments. Again the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is explicit in this regard with its 
preambular references to the “use of outer space for peaceful purposes” and its prohibition on 
any deployment of weapons of mass destruction or military activity on the moon or other 
celestial bodies. The WSIS Declaration of Principles is more indirect in its espousal of a peaceful 
character for cyberspace although this orientation can be inferred from its affirmation that “the 
Information Society should respect peace…” and its call that “A global culture of cyber-security 
needs to be promoted, developed and implemented in cooperation with all stakeholders…”10  
A fourth commonality is that both spaces pose particular difficulties for the monitoring 
and verification of state behaviour. Although there is a large-scale effort to monitor outer space 
anchored in the US military-operated Space Surveillance Network, this is primarily directed at 
tracking space debris and avoiding collisions and is not geared towards verifying the state of 
space assets generally. Verification of any potential restrictions on military activity in space has 
been viewed as a difficult task, and one that, in the opinion of some, would render any eventual 
arms control measures in space unverifiable. An analogous situation pertains in cyberspace in 
  Outer Space and Cyber Space    9 
 
which the extent and nature of the technology employed poses major challenges for monitoring 
activity, making attribution and for verifying compliance with possible cooperative 
arrangements.  
Finally, and probably linked to the last point, is that neither outer space nor cyberspace 
has been subjected to much in the way of international governance or regulation to preserve their 
peaceful character (with the important early exception of the Outer Space Treaty). This limited 
governance presence is the current reality even as it is widely acknowledged that both 
environments would be highly vulnerable if destructive attacks were to occur in them. The 
Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy stated for example: “The space and 
cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives and military operations are vulnerable to 
disruption and attack”.11 
The Differences 
In turning to the differences between the two spaces, the first and most obvious is that 
outer space is a natural environment whereas cyberspace is a human-made one. Outer space is a 
vast, timeless domain in which humankind is only gradually projecting itself. Cyberspace, while 
equally vast at one level, has been developed in the time frame of a generation and its nature is 
purely within human control.  
A second major difference between the two spaces might be described as the “threshold 
of entry” to them. To enter and use outer space requires sophisticated and costly assets and 
capabilities, usually possessed by a small number of states and a few multinational companies. In 
contrast cyberspace can be explored by anyone with a personal computer or mobile device. The 
basic equipment is relatively cheap and users are numbered in the billions. 
A third difference between the realms is that outer space activity is still dominated by 
state actors although there is a recent trend towards privatization of some services. Currently 
there are only ten spacefaring nations possessing an independent orbital launch capacity. In 
contrast, the infrastructure of cyberspace is largely owned and operated by the private sector and 
civil society. 
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Finally, there is a difference in the manner to which the two realms have been treated to 
date under international law. Outer space has benefited from an early foundational treaty that 
defined its character. Although this treaty is now 48 years old and many states believe that the 
legal regime it created for outer space needs to be reinforced (see notably the resolution on the 
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” which is annually adopted by the UN General 
Assembly with near universal support and which in reference to the legal regime for outer space 
states that “there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its 
effectiveness…”12) it nonetheless provides an authoritative reference point. No similar treaty has 
yet been devised to define cyberspace and efforts to formalize cooperation via international legal 
instruments (e.g. the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime) have not met as yet with wide 
spread support amongst states.13   
External Drivers 
Taking into account the results of this brief survey of the similarities and differences of 
the two environments of outer space and cyberspace, there are two preliminary conclusions to be 
drawn for the purposes of international security. The first is that the current benign environment 
for operating in outer space and cyberspace provides major benefits to the international 
community and should be preserved. The second is that this current benign condition should not 
be taken for granted and that states (and stakeholders) should engage diplomatically now to 
ensure that these unique spaces are indeed preserved for peaceful utilisation by humanity in the 
future. To achieve this goal will require the forging of new agreements and the development of 
innovative measures of practical cooperation. 
In the last few years, we are beginning to witness the commencement of official efforts at 
the preventive diplomacy that this author would advocate for safeguarding both outer space and 
cyber space. It would have been gratifying to have been able to attribute these initiatives to far-
sighted and well-reasoned policies by key states. Regrettably, this recent activism was more 
likely prompted by external actions that threatened the long-standing benign environments and 
that stirred governments into preparing some measures in an effort to forestall devastating 
consequences down the road.  
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For outer space, the disturbing events prompting governmental action were most 
probably the anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) tests carried out by China and the US in 2007 and 
2008 respectively. The impact of these military actions, which raised the long dormant threat of 
ASAT employment, were exacerbated by the accidental collision of a defunct Russian satellite 
and an active American one in 2009 which further contributed to the already disconcerting 
increase of space debris. Such debris, of course, poses a significant hazard for space operations 
and there are already warnings from informed observers that the build-up of such debris poses a 
constant and significant threat to all spacecraft, especially those situated in low earth orbits.14  
For cyberspace, the external developments which seem to be spurring nascent diplomatic 
initiatives are the publicly revealed initiation of state sponsored offensive cyber attacks in the 
form of the “Stuxnet” and “Flame” malware payloads and the generally higher publicity being 
given to cyber attacks against a range of public and private institutions. Governmental agencies 
tend not to be forthcoming with their cyber attack statistics, but it is widely acknowledged that 
state institutions are far from being immune from penetrations of their computer networks and 
the exfiltration of sensitive data. Although the magnitude of attacks in cyberspace eclipse those 
in outer space, in both realms, the diplomatic proposals now surfacing represent an effort by 
states to preclude destructive actions in these fragile environments and to promote a cooperative 
security approach with respect to them.  
Diplomatic Proposals for Outer Space Security 
The diplomatic proposals for outer space security that have been advanced consist of four 
main types. Russia and China have been developing for some time elements of a treaty that 
would prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space. The genesis of this effort can be traced 
back to 2002 when Russia and China first introduced a working paper at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva presenting several elements for such a treaty. This initiative was 
probably in response to the decision by the United States the year before to abrogate the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and with it one of the few legally binding prohibitions on 
deployment of weapons in outer space (in this case, space-based ABM systems). China and 
Russia have developed these elements over the next years and in February 2008, a draft treaty 
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“on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 
Against Outer Space Objects” (better known by its acronym PPWT), was formally presented at 
the Conference on Disarmament.15 In essence this accord seeks to reinforce the Outer Space 
Treaty’s prohibition on stationing WMD in outer space by extending this ban to all weapons in 
space. The draft met with criticism from several quarters. Some faulted its failure to address 
ground-based anti-satellite weapons although given the inherent ASAT capability of ballistic 
missile interceptors, any effort to include ground-based systems would have run up against the 
US commitment to deploy ballistic missile defences. Other states complained about the lack of 
verification provisions for the treaty given the significant military prohibitions contained in it. 
The Chinese and Russian sponsors attempted to respond to these critiques and in June 2014 
presented a revised version of the PPWT that included a new article acknowledging the need for 
verification measures and suggesting that these could be elaborated in a subsequent protocol to 
the treaty. Whatever the merits of the draft text, further consideration of it has been stymied by 
the general blockage of the Conference on Disarmament and to date the treaty’s sponsors have 
not decided to take their draft text to any other forum.  
The second initiative was brought forward by the European Union, originally in 
December of 2008. It took the form of a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” a 
politically binding “set of best practices” designed to support safe operations in space. While in 
many ways a re-packaging of existing commitments and principles regarding state activity in 
outer space, the Code does include provision for significant institutional support for the 
multilateral review of outer space activity via annual information exchanges, biennial meetings 
of subscribing states and a central “point of contact” performing secretariat-like functions. The 
Code also foresees consultative mechanisms in the eventuality that activities are undertaken 
which could be contrary to the Code’s commitments and which might pose a risk of damage to 
others. The EU has issued revised versions of its original proposal in 2010, 2012 and most 
recently in March 2014. Over this period the EU has conducted several bilateral and three 
multilateral consultations.16 The EU’s initial effort to confine consultations with others to 
bilateral tracks in a sort of ‘hub and spoke’ process was not well received and important states 
such as China, India, South Africa and Brazil voiced concerns. The EU Code of Conduct 
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initiative has also suffered from various disconnects and changes in responsible personnel and 
has experienced difficulty in maintaining diplomatic momentum for wider acceptance of the 
Code, despite an endorsement by the US in January 2012. EU representatives have indicated that 
they are ready to “move the process from a consultation to a negotiating phase in an inclusive 
and transparent manner”, but the exact way forward favoured by the EU is still unclear.17 In July, 
2015 the EU in cooperation with the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs organized a session at 
UN HQ in New York that it hoped would constitute a multilateral negotiation of its draft Code to 
set the stage for its adoption. Several participating states, notably the BRICS grouping (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) opposed this approach insisting that the future elaboration 
of the Code be held “in the format of inclusive and consensus-based multilateral negotiations 
within the framework of the UN”.18 It would seem in this light that any future negotiation of the 
EU’s Code of Conduct would depend on seeking a resolution in the UN General Assembly to 
mandate such a multilateral process.  
The third proposal was made by Canada in 2009 in the form of a working paper 
submitted to the Conference on Disarmament and reiterated in the context of the UN General 
Assembly.19 This proposal consisted of a series of unilateral “pledges” that would have states 
declare that they would not: i) test or use a weapon against a satellite so as to damage or destroy 
it; ii) deploy any weapons in outer space and iii) use a satellite itself as a weapon. These 
commitments were seen as providing some of the security content missing in the EU Code while 
avoiding the problems associated with the PPWT’s new treaty approach. Canada however has 
not actively promoted these ideas subsequently and other states have not come out in favour of 
them, although some concerned NGOs have suggested similar measures.20  
The last initiative concerns the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that began its 
work in July 2012 pursuant to a Russian-led resolution that has been adopted for several years by 
the UN General Assembly.21 The fifteen-member GGE was mandated to consider possible 
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures for outer space and produced a consensus 
report in the summer of 2013 that was presented to the General Assembly for consideration. The 
report described transparency and confidence-building measures as “a means by which 
Governments can share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and trust, 
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reducing misperceptions and miscalculations and thereby helping both to prevent military 
confrontation and to foster regional and global stability”.22 The report enumerated several 
potential transparency and confidence-building measures, including information exchange and 
notification, risk reduction measures, visits to space-related facilities and consultative 
mechanisms. The report said that these transparency and confidence-building measures should be 
considered as non-legally binding voluntary measures and that they were “neither a substitute 
nor a precondition for arms limitation and disarmament measures”.23 Although the GGE was 
successful in producing a substantive report with specific recommendations for transparency and 
confidence-building measures, it could do no more than present this menu of potential action 
items to the international community and see if states were prepared to adopt the measures 
proposed. 
One particular recommendation from the GGE that is due to be realized this fall is a joint 
session of the UN General Assembly’s First and Fourth Committees, the committees that have 
dealt respectively with the security and peaceful uses of outer space themes. This special joint 
session, which is to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability, could 
provide a forum for focused consideration of the proposed transparency and confidence-building 
measures generated by the GGE. Regrettably the cooperative atmosphere that characterized the 
work of the GGE and contributed to its ability to fashion a consensus report has deteriorated in 
the post-2013 period, with the revival of East-West tensions over Ukraine that will render more 
difficult agreement on any new cooperative arrangements concerning outer space. Symptomatic 
of this current problematic diplomatic environment was the decision by Russia and several other 
states to push forward in 2014 with a new UN General Assembly resolution on “No first 
placement of weapons in outer space” despite opposition from a significant minority of states. 
These states believed that declaratory commitments not to be the first to place weapons in outer 
space, as urged in the resolution, did not meet the criteria for true transparency and confidence-
building measures as earlier agreed by the GGE. The sponsors decided nevertheless to proceed to 
a vote on the resolution, which was adopted with a 126 states in favour, 4 opposed (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Israel and the US) and 46 abstaining. The divisive nature of this result was in contrast 
with the consensual status of most space-related resolutions in the General Assembly and reflects 
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the gap that is opening up amongst space powers that may impede the adoption of any new 
cooperative agreements or arrangements in the near term.  
Diplomatic Proposals for International Cyber Security 
Diplomatic proposals for international security in cyber space are more recent and less 
numerous than for outer space, but are also starting to surface. The United States, while not 
bringing forward any specific proposal of its own, officially called for the forging of a consensus 
on “norms for responsible state behaviour” in its path-breaking International Strategy for 
Cyberspace released by the White House in May 2011.24 Having issued this important call for an 
urgent dialogue amongst states to develop these norms, the Obama Administration has found it 
difficult to translate this policy aim into any multilateral diplomatic process to yield the desired 
result. In the event other states were the first off the mark in proposing some specific content to 
meet the goal of “norms for responsible state behaviour”. In September of that same year, Russia 
and China (in conjunction with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) circulated at the UN General 
Assembly a proposal for an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security”. In 
presenting the proposal, Ambassador Wang Qun of China, declared that “countries should work 
to keep information and cyber space from becoming a new battlefield, prevent an arms race in 
information and cyber space and settle disputes on this front peacefully through dialogue”.25  
Originally, the key commitment of this voluntary code would be for states “not to use 
Information and Communication Technologies, including networks, to carry out hostile activities 
or acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace and security or proliferate information 
weapons or related technologies”.26 After having carried out consultations with other states on 
the margins of the UN General Assembly, China and Russia decided to issue a revised version of 
their Code of Conduct in January 2015. Significantly the arms control orientation of the initial 
draft has been dropped in favour of a much more general formulation by which subscribing 
states would commit “Not to use information and communications technologies and information 
and communications networks to carry out activities which run counter to the task of maintaining 
international peace and security”.27 Presumably the consultations with others had persuaded the 
sponsors that the original arms control orientation was not feasible at this stage given the 
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practical problems associated with it such as the lack of any agreed definition of an “information 
weapon”. The revised Sino-Russian Code still retains a ‘security’ focus however especially via 
the elements aimed at countering content from information and communications technologies 
that is perceived to incite “terrorism, separatism or extremism” or threaten states’ “political, 
economic and social security”.28 These provisions are aligned with Sino-Russian views on the 
necessity to police content and on the sovereign rights of states to exercise control over their 
information infrastructure. The very term “information security” preferred by China and Russia 
to the term “cyber security” favoured by the West is illustrative of the former’s concern with 
content as opposed to the latter’s focus on system integrity.  
Diplomatically, the Sino-Russian partnership on new approaches to outer space security 
has carried over into cyberspace with a similar leadership being shown by Beijing and Moscow 
on arrangements to promote “information security”. Their activism on the space and cyber 
security files also reflects a pragmatic capacity to refine their proposals in light of the prevailing 
diplomatic context. For example, the Russian-Chinese decision to present their set of cyber 
security norms as a voluntary, politically binding Code of Conduct instead of as an international 
legal instrument, suggests that they had absorbed the lessons from their earlier joint initiative of 
the PPWT. With respect to the new cyber initiative the co-sponsors were opting now for a 
simpler format and one which would be easier and quicker for states to adopt. Russia and China 
as chief sponsors of this proposal have also proceeded with some care and have taken the time to 
conduct consultations with other states regarding their draft Code of Conduct, thus enabling them 
to present their revised version as reflecting input received from others. Arguably this has 
increased the eventual acceptability of their proposal for a Code of Conduct on Information 
Security and positions China and Russia to press for the adoption by the UN General Assembly 
of their text when they judge the time is propitious to do so.  
One reason why Russia and China have decided not to move forward more rapidly with 
their draft Code of Conduct may be linked to the other major diplomatic initiative related to 
international cyber security that is currently on-going within the UN context. This is the work of 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” referred to earlier. These 
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GGEs originated with a Russian-led UNGA resolution and first yielded a consensus report in 
2010. The 2010 report observed that states were developing Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICTs) “as instruments of warfare and intelligence” and called for “confidence-
building, stability and risk reduction measures to address the implications of state use of ICTs”.29 
Following close upon the earlier report another UN Group of Governmental Experts, which, like 
its outer space counterpart, also got underway in the summer of 2012 and succeeded in 
producing a report in June 2013. The 2013 GGE report went further than its predecessor to warn 
that “the absence of common understandings on acceptable State behaviour with regard to the 
use of ICTs increases the risk to international peace and security”.30 The report recommended 
that states consider taking action on norms and principles of responsible behaviour; on 
confidence-building measures and on capacity-building measures. Again while the GGE 
produced a set of practical if modest measures for states to consider, actual implementation is 
essentially left to the initiative of those states. Having already been instrumental in the 
establishment of the 2010 and 2013 GGEs, Russia decided to maintain the diplomatic 
momentum it had generated on the issue of international cyber security, by initiating yet another 
GGE. This expanded (20 members versus the usual 15) GGE produced a consensus report in the 
summer of 2015 that will be considered at the General Assembly this October. In addition to its 
existing mandate on norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures, the 
GGE was mandated to consider “the issues of the use of ICTs in conflicts and how international 
law applies to the use of ICTs by States”.31 The GGE report succeeded in further developing 
norms and rules for State cyber conduct, suggesting for example that states refrain from ICT 
activity “that intentionally damages critical infrastructure”.32 The report recommends that a 
further GGE be created in 2016, although mere continuation of GGE “studies” may begin to 
suffer from diminishing returns. It is evident in the cyber security field that as countries move 
beyond statements of lofty, general principles and begin to address specific measures, divisions 
of views become more pronounced and concrete outcomes more elusive. Ultimately, states will 
need to move beyond the restricted participation of the GGEs and embrace some form of 
broader, multilateral negotiating forum if the ideas being generated by the GGEs are to be 
transformed into agreed commitments.  
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Prospects for Cooperation 
Despite the challenges that international cooperation on outer space and especially in the 
new domain of cyber security faces, there is also a growing parallel concern that the preservation 
of the peaceful environments of outer space and cyber space are too important a set of objectives 
to leave only in the hands of the military. In both the case of outer space and cyber space, and 
especially with the latter, there is a large and potentially influential civilian lobby comprised of 
business and civil society actors that is increasingly aware of the threats to cyber space and 
engaged in prodding governments into some preventive action. The private sector’s refrain is that 
the time has come to establish a public–private partnership to address global cyber security 
threats and to develop policy responses, including the formulation of cyber security norms. As 
one large multinational firm has stated: “The development of cybersecurity norms cannot be a 
niche foreign policy issue reserved for diplomats. Cybersecurity norms are an imperative for all 
users, governments, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and individuals, in an 
Internet-dependent world – each contributes to the peace, security and sustained innovation of a 
globally interconnected society”.33 This civil society concern over the harmful consequences of a 
lawless cyberspace is starting to be manifested in diplomatic forums. At the UN General 
Assembly’s fall session in 2014, nine NGOs delivered a joint statement seeking action by states 
to adopt “an effective international legal framework that will prevent cyber attacks and protect 
the networked infrastructure upon which societies rely for their wellbeing”.34 
Barring another dramatic external event that draws attention to the vulnerability of these 
operating environments to disruption through irresponsible state behaviour, it may in fact be this 
private sector and civil society lobbying which will spur governments to take more decisive 
action. Although the work on outer space security pre-dates that on cyber security, it may well be 
in the latter realm that the first international security arrangements are devised. State authorities 
may feel a priority need to put down some initial markers of restraint regarding their conduct in 
cyberspace and to reassure the civilian sector that the government will not endanger this critical 
infrastructure through irresponsible action. The articulation of norms for responsible state 
behaviour, especially in the form of voluntary, political undertakings are likely to be the 
preferred route for states given their inherent flexibility and timeliness and the avoidance of the 
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need to develop verification provisions that would have to underpin new international legal 
instruments.  
Given the intrinsically global character of both outer space and cyber space, it is 
understandable why much of the diplomatic consideration of the problem of security in these 
realms has occurred within the universal, multilateral context of the UN. Important 
complementary work has also been underway at the regional level, especially concerning cyber 
security. In Europe the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been 
active on the international security dimension of cyber space and in April 2012 set itself the goal 
of developing a first set of CBMs “to enhance interstate co-operation, transparency, 
predictability, and stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that 
may stem from the use of ICTs”.35 The OSCE initiative yielded an initial set of CBMs that were 
approved at the organization’s December 2013 Ministerial meeting. Although the eleven 
measures adopted are primarily voluntary exchanges of information on various aspects of ICTs, 
there is provision for on-going institutional support by means of a dedicated working group that 
is to meet at least three times a year to discuss the information exchange and explore further 
CBM development.36 The deterioration of East-West relations attendant upon the Ukraine crisis 
has likely put a damper on some of the cooperation envisaged by the CBMs, but the OSCE 
action stands out as the first multilateral agreement on cyber security CBMs and will probably 
serve as a model for others.  
Whether it occurs at the universal or regional level, the initiation of bilateral and 
multilateral consultations on how to ensure the continued peaceful exploitation of both outer 
space and cyber space would usefully contribute to increased awareness, confidence-building 
and eventually the development of cooperative security arrangements. Given the potential mass 
disruption stemming from offensive cyber operations or space negation actions there should be 
an inherent interest on the part of states to engage in preventive diplomacy in these two realms. 
The intrinsically universal character of these two “global commons” militates in favour of as 
inclusive a regime as possible and this in turn puts a premium on developing measures that can 
be agreed under UN auspices. It will be crucial for all concerned stakeholders to be pro-active in 
this regard and to begin to move now to preclude the most damaging manifestations of conflict in 
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these vulnerable environments and thereby help sustain safe and secure access to them for all 
people at all times. 
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